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The current approaches for finding hostile insiders 
are based on “signatures.”
Sample signature to find a problem employee:






• if the mail is from a departing insider
• and the message was sent in last 30 days
• and the recipient is not in organization’s domain
• and the total bytes summed by day is more than X,
➜ send an alert to security operator
We propose a new approach for finding 
threatening insiders—storage profile anomalies.
Hypothesis 1: 





Some illegal activity has storage indicators:
• Contraband software (hacking tools) and data
• Large amount of:
—graphics
—PII; PHI; account numbers
—Encrypted data
• Stolen documents 
Illegal employee activity is:
• Bad for business
• Exploitation threat 
• Fraud risk
We also want to detect other kinds of illegal 
employee activity.
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Our plan: look for storage devices that are different 
than their peers.
We build a “storage profile” from features:
• # of credit card numbers, phone #s; SSNs, DOBs, etc.
• % pictures; %video




• Others in role.
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Garfinkel, S. and Shelat, A., "Remembrance of Data Passed: A Study of Disk 
Sanitization Practices," IEEE Security & Privacy, January/February 2003.
Our approach:
Collect “storage profiles” and look for outliers.
We profile storage on the hard drive/storage device:
• Allocated & “deleted” files; Unallocated space (file fragments)
Statistical profile is collected:
• Frequently, at “random” times
• Securely — by going to raw media












We cluster the storage profiles to find “outliers.”
What’s an outlier?
• Something that’s different from its peers






Outlier detection should have significant benefits:
• Not signature based
• Not reliant on access patterns 
• Not reliant on policy definition, discovery, auditing
Design constraints:
• Agent must be scalable and cannot interfer with operations
—Desktop: background process, samples disk data
—Network load: small, aggregated data transfer
—Management console: scalable algorithms used
• Must work with isolated systems
• Must be OS agnostic






Our system has three parts:
1. Sample disk to collect desired data 
• bulk_extractor
— a lightweight media forensics tool 
2. Client-server, enterprise response framework
• Google Rapid Response (GRR)
3. Anomaly detection agent
• Univariate and multivariate outlier detection
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GRR  is  an  Incident  Response  Framework  focused  on  Remote  Live  Forensics.
State  of  the  Project
GRR  is  currently  in  an  Beta  release,  ready  for  testing  by  end  users.  More
information  can  be  found  in  the  GRR  Rapid  Response  documentation.
Update:  November  2  2013  Test  release  for  0.2-­9  is  out!  You  can  get  it  by
download  the  install  script  as  per  Testing  Release
Update:  August  28  2013:  GRR  v  0.2-­8  is  out!  Grab  it  by  redownloading  the
install  script,  as  described  in  GettingStarted.
Known  issue:  This  release  comes  with  a  prebuilt  mac  client  which  does  not
support  custom  client  names,  it  will  always  run  as  "grr"  regardless  of  your
Client.name  settings.
Information
GRR  consists  of  an  agent  that  can  deployed  to  a  target  system,  and  a  server
infrastructure  that  can  manage  and  talk  to  the  agent.  More  information  can  be
found  in  the  GRR  Developer  documentation.
Client  Features:
Cross-­platform  support  for  Linux,  Mac  OS  X  and  Windows  clients  (agents)
Open  source  memory  drivers  for  Linux,  Mac  OS  X  and  Windows
Supports  searching,  downloading
Volatility  integration  for  memory  analysis
Secure  communication  infrastructure  designed  for  Internet  deployment
Client  automatic  update  support
Server  Features:
Fully  fledged  response  capabilities  handling  most  incident  response  and
forensics  tasks
OS-­level  and  raw  access  file  system  access,  using  the  SleuthKit  (TSK)
Ajax  Web  UI
Fully  scriptable  IPython  console  access
Enterprise  hunting  support
Basic  system  timelining  features
Basic  reporting  infrastructure
Support  for  asynchronous  flows
Fully  scaleable  back-­end  to  handle  very  large  deployments
Detailed  monitoring  of  client  CPU,  memory,  IO  usage
Automated  scheduling  for  reoccurring  tasks
See  GettingStarted  to  start  using  it.
Garfinkel, Simson, Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and 
bulk_extractor. Computers and Security 32: 56-72 (2013)
Random sampling is a great way to analyze data.
Simple random sampling can determine % free space
Data characterization can determine the kind of stored data
Sector hashing can identify specific target files
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Audio Data reported by iTunes: 2.25 GiB 2.42 GB
MP3 files reported by file system: 2.39 GB
Estimated MP3 usage with random sampling : 2.49 GB 10,000 random samples
2.71 GB 5,000 random samples
Figure 1: Usage of a 160GB iPod reported by iTunes 8.2.1 (6) (top), as reported by the file system (bottom center), and
as computing with random sampling (bottom right). Note that iTunes usage actually in GiB, even though the program
displays the “GB” label.
length offset. If a frame is recognized from byte pat-
terns and the next frame is found at the specified off-
set, then there is a high probability that the fragment
contains an excerpt of the media type in question.
Field validation Once headers or frames are recognized,
they can be validated by “sanity checking” the fields
that they contain.
n-gram analysis As some n-grams are more common
than others, discriminators can base their results
upon a statistical analysis of n-grams in the fragment.
Other statistical tests Tests for entropy and other statis-
tical properties can be employed.
Context recognition Finally, if a fragment cannot be
readily discriminated, it is reasonable to analyze the
adjacent fragments. This approach works for frag-
ments found on a hard drive, as most files are stored
contiguously[15]. This approach does not work for
identifying fragments in physical memory, however,
as modern memory systems make no effort to co-
locate adjacent fragments in the computer’s physical
memory map.
4.3 Three Discriminators
In this subsection we present three discriminators that
we have created. Each of these discriminators was devel-
oped in Java and tested on the NPS govdocs1 file corpus
[16], supplemented with a collection of MP3 and other
files that were developed for this project.
To develop each of these discriminators we started
with a reading of the file format specification and a vi-
sual examination of file exemplars using a hex editor (the
EMACS hexl mode), the Unix more command, and the
Unix strings command. We used our knowledge of file
types to try to identify aspects of the specific file format
that would be indicative of the type and would be unlikely
to be present in other file types. We then wrote short test
programs to look for the features or compute the relevant
statistics for what we knew to be true positives and true
negatives. For true negatives we used files that we thought
would cause significant confusion for our discriminators.
4.3.1 Tuning the discriminators
Many of our discriminators have tunable parameters.
Our approach for tuning the discriminators was to use a
grid search. That is, we simply tried many different possi-
ble values for these parameters within a reasonable range
and selected the parameter value that worked the best. Be-
cause we knew the ground truth we were able to calcu-
late the true positive rate (TPR) and the false positive rate
(FPR) for each combination of parameter settings. The
(FPR,TPR) for the particular set of values was then plot-
ted as an (X,Y) point, producing a ROC curve[25].
4.3.2 JPEG Discriminator
To develop our JPEG discriminator we started by read-
ing the JPEG specification. We then examined a number
of JPEGs, using as our source the JPEGs from the gov-
docs1 corpus[16].
JPEG is a segment-based container file in which each
segment begins with a FF byte followed by segment
identifier. Segments can contain metadata specifying the
size of the JPEG, quantization tables, Huffman tables,
Huffman-coded image blocks, comments, EXIF data, em-
bedded comments, and other information. Because meta-
data and quantization tables are more-or-less constant and
the number of blocks is proportional to the size of the
JPEG, small JPEGs are dominated by metadata while
large JPEGs are dominated by encoded blocks.
The JPEG format uses the hex character FF to indi-
cate the start of segments. Because this character may oc-
cur naturally in Huffman-coded data, the JPEG standard
specifies that naturally occurring FFs must be “stuffed”
(quoted) by storing them as FF00.
Our JPEG discriminator uses these characteristics to
identify Huffman-coded JPEG blocks. Our intuition was
to look for blocks that had high entropy but which had
more FF00 sequences than would be expected by chance.
We developed a discriminator that would accept a block as












Garfinkel, Simson, Vassil Roussev, Alex Nelson and Douglas White, Using purpose-built functions and 
block hashes to enable small block and sub-file forensics, DFRWS 2010, Portland, OR
Young J., Foster, K., Garfinkel, S., and Fairbanks, K., 
Distinct sector hashes for target file detection, IEEE 
Computer, December 2012
It takes 3.5 hours to read a 1TB hard drive.
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In 5 minutes you can read:
• 36 GB in one strip
• 100,000 randomly chosen 64KiB strips (assuming 3 msec/seek)
Minutes 208 5 5
Data 1 TB 36 GB 6.5 GB
# Seeks 1 1 100,000
% of data 100% 3.6% 0.65%
The statistics of a randomly chosen sample
predict the statistics of a population.
US elections can be 
predicted by sampling 
thousands of households:
13
Hard drive contents can be predicted by 
sampling thousands of sectors:
The challenge is identifying the sector 
content that is sampled.
The challenge is identifying 
likely voters.
We think of computers as devices with files.
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Data on computers is stored in fixed-sized sectors.
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Data in a sector can be resident:
Files can be “deleted” but the data remains:
Sectors can be wiped clean:
Allocated Data
Deleted Data
No Data blank sectors 
} user filesemail messages[temporary files]
Allocated data are the data you see from the root 























“Deleted data” are on the disk, 






































Sampling can tell us about the content of the data
Sampling can tell us the proportion of...
—blank sectors; video; HTML files; other data types...
—data with distinct signatures...
...provided we can identify it
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Challenge for sampling: interpreting each sector
—Easy:
0000000: ffd8 ffe0 0010 4a46 4946 0001 0201 0048  ......JFIF.....H
0000010: 0048 0000 ffe1 1d17 4578 6966 0000 4d4d  .H......Exif..MM
0000020: 002a 0000 0008 0007 0112 0003 0000 0001  .*..............
0000030: 0001 0000 011a 0005 0000 0001 0000 0062  ...............b
0000040: 011b 0005 0000 0001 0000 006a 0128 0003  ...........j.(..
0000050: 0000 0001 0002 0000 0131 0002 0000 001b  .........1......
0000060: 0000 0072 0132 0002 0000 0014 0000 008d  ...r.2..........
0000070: 8769 0004 0000 0001 0000 00a4 0000 00d0  .i..............
0000080: 0000 0048 0000 0001 0000 0048 0000 0001  ...H.......H....
0000090: 4164 6f62 6520 5068 6f74 6f73 686f 7020  Adobe Photoshop 
00000a0: 4353 2057 696e 646f 7773 0032 3030 353a  CS Windows.2005:
00000b0: 3035 3a30 3920 3136 3a30 313a 3432 0000  05:09 16:01:42..
00000c0: 0000 0003 a001 0003 0000 0001 0001 0000  ................
00000d0: a002 0004 0000 0001 0000 00c8 a003 0004  ................
00000e0: 0000 0001 0000 0084 0000 0000 0000 0006  ................
00000f0: 0103 0003 0000 0001 0006 0000 011a 0005  ................
—Hard:
000a000: 0011 fa71 57f4 6f5f ddff 00bd 15fb 5dfd  ...qW.o_......].
000a010: a996 0fc9 dff1 ff00 b149 e154 97f4 efd5  .........I.T....
000a020: e3f5 7f47 71df 8ffb d5d7 da9e d87f c12f  ...Gq........../
000a030: f8ff 00d8 b1f4 b1f8 ff00 c57e ab7a ff00  ...........~.z..
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We use two approaches for identifying data type.
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1 - SVMs with multiple feature types
• unigrams
• bigrams (selected)
• Other n-grams & complexity measures
• compressibility
• hand-tuned classifiers
2 - Known content
• Database of “sector hashes.”
Beebe, N.L.; Maddox, L.A.; Lishu Liu; Minghe Sun, "Sceadan: Using 
Concatenated N-Gram Vectors for Improved File and Data Type 
Classification,"Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on , 
vol.8, no.9, pp.1519,1530, Sept. 2013
Sceadan provides the “type” of fragments.
237
*Additional model training has improved 
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NOTE: 9 lowest 
performing types are 
significantly under-
researched classes (e.g. 
Office2010, FS data)
Improved performance comes from feature set.
Training is slow, but only needs to be done once.
Trigrams proved most accurate (70.19%)
• Much slower prediction time than competing alternatives
“FS5” (feature set 5) nearly as accurate (69.83%)
• Unigrams+Bigrams+Other 
—Other features: entropy, Kolmogrov complexity, mean byte 
value, Hamming weight, avg. contiguity between bytes, 
longest byte streak
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Some kinds of files have distinct contents.
Can you identify a JPEG file











[FF D8 FF E0] or [FF D8 FF E1]
[FF D9]
JPEG File
We can identify “distinct” sectors. 















Initial anomaly detection results are promising.
Successfully detecting univariate outliers
• Data by type most effective thus far
—File types (e.g., jpg, exe)
—Data types (e.g., PII, CCN)
• Median absolute deviation (MAD) based outlier detection with 
conditional scaling procedures
Multivariate and time-series based outlier detection — on-going
• Cluster based, SOM based, etc.
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This heatmap of anomalies let an analyst easily 
identify clusters and outliers.
28
Current status — We’re making progress!
bulk_extractor updated v1.4 just released
• Added features & GRR integration preparation
Sceadan data type classifier updated v1.2 released
Extraction, transformation, loading of datesets 
• M57 Patents (digitalcorpora.org) case
Progress on anomaly detection algorithm
• Real Data Corpus extraction, translation and loading near complete
• Theoretical development
• Empirical data descriptive analyses (test assumptions)
• Univariate anomaly detection performing well on synthetic data set
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We are in year 1 of a 3-year effort.
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NPS Lead UTSA Lead
Year 1 bulk_extractor upgrades
Outlier detection algorithm 
Synthetic data experimentation





Develop/test data outlier detection
Develop/test visualization 
component
Year 3 Large-scale testing on partner net
Final dev. of outlier detection 
algorithm
Final dev. of visualization agent
Many challenges remain.
“Anomalous” suggests “normal” exists
• Large, diverse, dislocated organizations
• High fluidity and variety in workforce
• Remote, mobile, multi-device access requirements
• Uninterruptible, critical computational operations
Clustering algorithm selection/development
• Accuracy and speed trade-off of extant algorithms
• Develop combinatorial algorithm to improve accuracy
• Need for automated parameter selection amidst noise
• Feature selection






In conclusion, we are developing a system that uses 
“lightweight media forensics” to find hostile insiders.
We use random sampling to build a storage profile of media
We collect these profiles on a central server
We cluster & data mine to find outliers.
Contact:
• Simson L. Garfinkel simsong@acm.org
• Nicole Beebe Nicole.Beebe@utsa.edu 
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